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Declining valuations and equilibrium bidding in central bank
refinancing operations
Abstract
Among the most puzzling observations on the euro money market are the discount in the weekly
refinancing operations, the more aggressive bidding under uncertainty, the temporary flatness of bid
schedules, and the development of interest rate spreads. To explain these observations, we consider a
standard divisible-good auction with either uniform or discriminatory pricing, and place it in the context
of a secondary market for interbank credit. The analysis links the empirical evidence to the endogenous
choice of collateral in credit transactions. We also discuss the Eurosystem's preference for the
discriminatory auction, the remuneration of reserves, and the impact of the recent market turmoil.
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I. Introduction
The euro money market, defined here as the market for euro-denominated short-term
credit between counterparties of the Eurosystem, has been challenging economists by
exhibiting a variety of puzzling features right from the market’s inception in January
1999.1 One of these features has been that credit seems to be obtainable at more
attractive conditions in the primary market, i.e., in central bank operations, than in
the secondary market, i.e., in the interbank market. This is counterintuitive because
the regular central bank operations in the euro area, the so-called main refinancing
operations, are eﬀectively highest-price auctions involving several hundred bidders.
How is a discount possible under such tight competition?2
The first account and explanation of the discount has been given in a semi-
nal contribution by Ayuso and Repullo (2003) who assume that the central bank
has an asymmetric objective function and penalizes downwards deviations of the
market rate more heavily than upwards deviations. As a consequence, the central
bank follows a tight allotment policy, driving the market rate above the policy rate,
which explains excessive bidding for central bank reserves. However, the explana-
tion depends on the central bank’s use of the so-called fixed-rate tender, through
which funds are oﬀered to market participants below market conditions. The model,
therefore, cannot account for the spread between primary and secondary market
conditions under the variable-tender regime which has been in place following June
2000.
Another potential explanation of the spread between primary and secondary
market conditions might be intermediation within the banking sector.3 Indeed,
Freixas and Holthausen (2004) have pointed out the role of money centers to dis-
tribute unexpected liquidity shocks within the euro area. Intermediation is useful
in this context because it reduces the informational frictions of unsecured lending,
especially in a cross-border context. However, in contrast to the case of unsecured
interbank lending considered by Freixas and Holthausen, all loans vis-à-vis the Eu-
rosystem have to be fully collateralized. This suggests that informational frictions
are not a central feature of lending allotted through Eurosystem tenders.4 To the
contrary, such intermediation is likely to cause unnecessary costs, for instance in
1Background information on the Eurosystem auctions and the euro money market is provided
in Appendix A.
2See Section II for an overview over the empirical evidence.
3Neyer and Wiemers (2004) have developed a model along these lines.
4There are also few other frictions. For eligible counterparties, participation in refinancing
operations is absolutely free of charges and does not require any specific skills. Moreover, the
Eurosystem accepts as collateral a broad range of assets including also very illiquid assets such
as credit claims and asset-backed securities. A counterparty that is unable to forward even such
collateral is unlikely to obtain any funding at reasonable conditions.
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terms of regulatory capital usage,5 counterparty risk, or collateral handling. In
sum, this suggests that we should find actually only limited intermediation, at least
outside of banking groups, of refinancing that had been received in the Eurosystem
tenders.6 We conclude that intermediation is not likely to fully explain the spread
in money market conditions.7
To better understand this and other pieces of evidence, the present paper oﬀers a
theoretical framework that integrates two institutional features of the Eurosystem’s
variable-rate tenders. The first element, adopted fromKlemperer andMeyer’s (1989)
analysis of oligopolistic competition, is an aggregate uncertainty (potentially small,
but not negligible) about the quantity that is eventually allotted in the auction.8 The
second element is an endogenous choice of collateral pledged to secure the individual
funding transaction. The framework is then used to study equilibrium bidding of
commercial banks in Eurosystem auctions in the context of a competitive secondary
market, where we allow both the uniform and the discriminatory pricing rule.9
The characterization of the equilibrium is shown to have a number of testable
implications, which are compared to the empirical evidence. First, we look at the
discount between primary and secondary market conditions, as discussed above.
The model predicts here that conditions oﬀered through the discriminatory auction
are typically strictly below marginal valuations even if there are many bidders. This
suggests an explanation for the obscure underpricing. Second, empirical research
tells us that with more uncertainty in the market, bids are on average placed at
higher interest rate levels. Intuitively, these findings reflect the bidder’s concern
of ending with insuﬃcient liquidity, i.e., the so-called loser’s nightmare (cf. Simon,
5Specifically, a capital charge applies to all unsecured interbank lending outstanding on report-
ing dates. Cf. Bindseil et al. (2003).
6A similar view is taken by Craig and Fecht (2007) who write that “...banks participating in
the main refinancing operations only try to provide the liquidity they really need for themselves—
particularly for fulfilling of their own minimum reserve requirements—instead of bidding to oﬀer
larger parts of the liquidity in the interbank market.”
7The spread in conditions is also not explained by diﬀerences in collateral standards between
primary and secondary markets. Specifically, the wider class of collateral accepted by the central
bank compared to the private market is no reason whatsoever to explain the lower rates in central
bank tenders compared to the interbank market. To the contrary, the diﬀerence in collateral
standards between primary and secondary money markets just reinforces the puzzling evidence.
8In the euro area, several eﬀects may cause uncertainty about the allotment for competitive bid-
ders. First, aggregate liquidity demand may change between the publication of liquidity conditions
and the actual allotment. Second, there may be counterparties with varying needs for liquidity
that are constrained due to a lack of suitable collateral and credit rating, and may therefore bid
at rates that win with probability one. A third possibility is the central bank’s discretion about
the allotment volume (on this last point, see also Section VIII and Appendix A).
9In either auction, bidders submit demand schedules, and a stop-out rate is determined by
equating demand and supply. Then, with uniform pricing, the bidders pay the stop-out rate, while
with discriminatory pricing, bidders pay their own bid rates.
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1994). Here again, the predictions of our theoretical framework are largely sup-
portive of the evidence. We identify, however, also a new eﬀect that might shed
additional light on incentives for bid shading in discriminatory auctions. Third,
during relatively calm periods, bidders in ECB repo auctions have tended to submit
excessively flat bid schedules at the level of the expected stop-out rate. We show
here that the slope of bid schedules is “nearly” vanishing when bidders face little
uncertainty and the liquidity of collateral assets is high. Again, this matches the
evidence. Finally, we discuss another observation, which is the unexpected increase
in the so-called Eonia spread with the introduction of an adapted implementation
framework in early 2004. Also here, the predictions are in line with the evidence.
Specifically, we show that a ceteris paribus increase in the size of the auction will
lead to a wider spread between conditions in the primary and secondary money
markets.
We go on to study the central bank’s decision on the pricing rule. Empirically,
the ECB seems to have a clear preference for using discriminatory pricing in its main
refinancing operations. Indeed, the uniform-pricing rule has been employed for the
main operations only in early 1999. To explore this issue, we determine the revenue
impact of the pricing rule, and find that in the identified equilibria, expected revenue
is strictly higher in the discriminatory auction than in uniform-price auction. This is
a somewhat unexpected result because the stronger bid shading in the discriminatory
auction had sometimes been understood to actually reduce the auctioneer’s expected
profits. We also show that the diﬀerence may be even more pronounced when
required reserves are, so the established terminology, remunerated at the marginal
rate, which is the case in the euro area. Finally, we mention another advantage of
the discriminatory format, which is related to the signaling role of tender rates.
A remarkable piece of evidence was revealed when market turmoil triggered by
the U.S. subprime crisis hit the euro money market. Specifically, it was found that
following August 2007, counterparties of the Eurosystem would be willing to pay
a premium above benchmark rates for participating in the auction. We apply our
formal framework to comment also on these developments.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews the empirical
evidence. Section III outlines the auction model. In Sections IV and V, we character-
ize bidding equilibria of the uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, respectively,
covering the cases of few and many bidders. Section VI relates our predictions for
many bidders to empirical observations for the euro area, while Section VII discusses
the Eurosystem’s potential motivation for using the discriminatory format. Section
VIII reviews some related theoretical literature. In Section IX, we derive predictions
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for bidding under market distress. Section X concludes. Appendices A through D
provide, respectively, background information on the euro money market, anecdotal
evidence on bid schedules in the Eurosystem auctions, a mathematical description
of the allotment rule, and formal proofs of the propositions.
II. Empirical evidence
This section reviews some evidence concerning the puzzles mentioned in the intro-
duction, i.e., concerning the spread between primary and secondary market con-
ditions, the loser’s nightmare, the flatness of bid schedules during calm periods,
and the increase in the Eonia spread. We will report here only on those findings
that appeared to us as most relevant given the purpose of the present discussion.
For a more comprehensive picture, the interested reader is referred to the original
contributions.
(a) Discount in the primary market. Consistent with the objectives of the
present analysis, we will focus on the period where the Eurosystem employed the
discriminatory variable-rate tender for its main refinancing operations, i.e., following
June 2000. During this period, the eﬀective average interest rate paid by counter-
parties in the repo auctions has been the weighted average tender rate. Interbank
conditions are more diﬃcult to measure, so that several proxies are is use. We know
of two papers that test for a positive spread.
Ayuso and Repullo (2003) analyze data for the period June 2000 through Sep-
tember 2001. During this period, the Eurosystem conducted 63 variable-rate ten-
ders with a 2-week maturity. Two alternative measures of the interbank rate have
been employed, namely 1-week Euribor and Eonia.10 The results were as follows.
The average spread between marginal tender rate and average tender rate (i.e., the
weighted average rate) has been 1.7 basis points. The spread of Euribor (Eonia)
above the average tender rate has been 4 basis points (3 basis points). Moreover, the
spread between Euribor (yet not Eonia) and the average tender rate was significantly
diﬀerent from zero during the considered period.
Neyer and Wiemers (2004) consider a somewhat longer data basis that covers
the period until December 2003. All variable-rate tenders during this period had a
maturity of two weeks. Given that the 2-week Euribor has been available since 15
October 2001, the authors calculate spreads of the weighted average rate over both
the 1-week and 2-week Euribor. The results are as follows. For the full (restricted)
sample of 138 auctions (87 auctions), the average spread of the 1-week Euribor (2-
week Euribor) over the weighted average rate in the Eurosystem auctions was 3.1
basis points (2.2 basis points). In both cases, the null hypothesis of a non-positive
10The 2-week Euribor was not yet available at that stage.
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spread has been rejected at a confidence level of 1%. The two Euribor spreads were
also significantly diﬀerent from zero when daily data is employed, and independent
of whether special events are accounted for.
We conclude that the available evidence conclusively suggests the existence of a
discount in Eurosystem auctions between June 2000 and December 2003.11
(b) The loser’s nightmare. An intriguing issue is the response of bidders in
Eurosystem auctions to an increase in uncertainty. We focus here on the impact
of market volatility on the level of bids and bid dispersion in the main refinancing
operations. Three recent contributions shed light on this issue.
Bindseil et al. (2005) evaluate bidding data for 53 main refinancing operations
during the period June 2000 through July 2001. All operations in the sample had
a maturity of two weeks and were conducted in the discriminatory format. The
benchmark for secondary market conditions has been the 2-week Eonia swap rate.
It is found that an increase in swap volatility by one basis point decreases the spread
of the swap over the weighted average bid rate (the weighted average winning rate)
by 0.374 basis points (0.526 basis points), and increases bid dispersion, measured
as the quantity-weighted standard deviation of bid rates, by 0.043 basis points.
These eﬀects are reported to be significant. Thus, as the volatility of the swap
rate increases, banks appear to bid more aggressively, i.e., higher relative to the
benchmark. Bids are also somewhat more dispersed. The results do not change when
regressions are re-run with a portion of the highest bids discarded from bid schedules.
Also the introduction of inter-bidder dispersion as an additional explanatory variable
does not invalidate the findings. The authors conclude that private information
and the winner’s curse are not driving bidding behavior in the Eurosystem’s main
refinancing operations.
Bruno et al. (2005) analyze panel data covering 59 main refinancing operations
during the period July 2000 through August 2001. All operations had a maturity
of two weeks, and were conducted under the discriminatory pricing rule. It is found
that the volatility of the 2-week Eonia swap series has a positive and highly signif-
icant impact on the spread between average bid rate and minimum bid rate in the
main refinancing operations. I.e., as swap volatility increases, bidders are placing
bids at higher interest rate levels. Moreover, volatility has also been found to have
a significant positive eﬀect on bid dispersion.
11In fact, more evidence is available. Bindseil et al. (2005) have the interesting finding that an
increase in the swap spread over the minimum bid rate by one basis point leads to an increase in
the average bid by strictly less than one basis point. In a similar vein, Bruno et al. (2005) show that
bidders shade their bids below market rates by about a quarter of the swap spread. Supportive
evidence is also provided in ECB (2001).
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The paper by Linzert et al. (2007) is concerned primarily with longer-term refi-
nancing operations. The data set covers 50 auctions conducted in the period March
1999 through May 2003 as pure variable-rate tenders, i.e., without a minimum bid
rate. Pricing has been discriminatory in these operations. Uncertainty is proxied
by the implied volatility derived from options on the 3-month Euribor. In contrast
to the findings on the main refinancing operations, an increase in volatility turns
out to decrease the weighted average bid rate significantly (and likewise bid disper-
sion). Thus, as volatility increases, bidders are placing their bids at lower interest
rate levels. The authors conclude that the private information component of refi-
nancing is more pronounced in longer-term refinancing than in the main refinancing
operations.
In sum, the evidence suggests that private information about the common value
of liquidity is not a central feature of the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations.
Rather, uncertainty seems to drive up average bid levels in these tenders, both in
absolute terms and relative to market rates. Also bid dispersion goes up in response
to more uncertainty. Bidding in longer-term operations, however, seems to follow a
diﬀerent logic.
(c) Flatness of bid schedules. A widely acknowledged phenomenon is that
in calm markets, bid schedules in ECB repo auctions are often concentrated on very
few grid points. Cassola et al. (2007) consider a data set covering 31 main refinanc-
ing operations during the period March 2004 through October 2004. The sample
period was characterized by a stable minimum bid rate of 2 percent, and by an ab-
sence of almost any interest rate expectations, end-of-year eﬀects, or other potential
causes of market volatility. Indeed, the descriptive statistics of the data captures
the characteristics of an extremely calm period. Stable secondary market conditions
are reflected by an average Eonia swap rate of 2.0306 percent and an average market
repo rate of 2.011 percent. Bidders had also relatively little uncertainty about the
total allotment, which fluctuated somewhat around an average of EUR 239 bn. The
number of bidders was 359 on average, which compares to an average of only 515
bids per auction. In line with the degenerated shape of bid schedules, the average
marginal tender rate (weighted average rate) was at 2.007 percent (2.0148 percent).
However, the relatively modest average bid-to-cover ratio of 1.26 suggests that even
during this period, the remaining uncertainty induced bidders to compete in the
interest rate dimension rather than by merely overbidding at the margin.
(d) Eonia spread increased. In spring 2004, changes to the operational
framework have been implemented that implied a significant increase in the volume
of the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations. Initially, there was also a signifi-
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cant reduction in the uncertainty concerning market rates and supply surrounding
the auctions because the ECB decided to provide more information and because
expectations of rate changes were in principle no longer relevant for the bidding.
From fall 2004 onwards, however, there was a clearly visible increase in the spread
between Eonia and the minimum bid rate. Hassler and Nautz (2007) report that
the median of the Eonia spread, i.e., the spread between Eonia and the minimum
bid rate, has increased from 5 basis points before the changes to 8 basis points af-
terwards. In response to the widened spread, the ECB decided to slightly increase
the allotment in the regular operations.
III. The model
To examine the evidence reviewed above, we will consider now a formal set-up with a
central bank and finitely many counterparties. Each counterparty (or simply bank)
will be endowed with a positive or negative balance on its reserve account. This bal-
ance may (but need not) be defined relative to exogenous reserve requirements. The
bank minimizes net funding costs (or equivalently, maximizes net interest income)
subject to the condition that it must clear the balance. Liquidity can be obtained
either in the form of an allotment in the central bank auction or through interbank
loans. We will assume that the auction precedes the trading, so any open position
remaining after the auction must be closed using the interbank market.
As discussed in the Introduction, one key element of our theory is the explicit
modeling of collateral requirements. Our specific assumptions in this dimension are
motivated by the institutional environment of the euro money market. Two sorts of
collateral will be available, a liquid one that can be used both in the primary and
in the secondary market, and an illiquid one that can be used only in the primary
market. We will assume that all credit vis-à-vis the central bank must be fully
collateralized. In the private market, this will not be a requirement, but funding via
secured lending may involve lower interest rates.
Against this back-drop, we develop the model. Altogether four perfectly divisible
assets have a role in the model: central bank reserves (“liquidity”), liquid collat-
eral, illiquid collateral, and net interest. For simplicity, we will assume that net
interest payments are settled at a somewhat later stage so that these cash flows do
not interfere with the management of liquidity in the current reserve maintenance
period. There is a finite population of N ≥ 3 risk-neutral banks. Each bank’s initial
liquidity position may be positive (a demand), zero, or negative (excess liquidity).
For simplicity, we assume that the population of banks decomposes into two groups,
banks i = 1, .., n with liquidity demand q0i > 0 and banks k = n + 1, ..., N with
zero or excess liquidity eq0k ≤ 0, where 2 ≤ n ≤ N − 1. Thus, there are at least two
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counterparties with a liquidity deficit and there is at least one counterparty with
excess liquidity.
The timeline is divided by five dates. At date 0, the central bank makes a public
announcement of the competitive allocation of a neutralizing quantity of liquidity,
where the total allotment eQ = nX
i=1
q0i +
NX
k=n+1
eq0k (1)
will be known with certainty only at date 2. Bids are submitted at date 1. Commer-
cial banks are informed about their allotments at date 2, and must then transfer an
amount of collateral equal to the allotment to the central bank. At date 3, liquidity
may be exchanged against collateral in the interbank market. Finally, at date 4, all
secured transactions mature, i.e., collateral and liquidity are transferred back, both
vis-à-vis the central bank and in the secondary market. Moreover, also at date 4,
net interest is paid, both on central bank operations and interbank transactions.
Each counterparty with a liquidity demand, i.e., each bank i = 1, ..., n is assumed
to possess suﬃciently large endowments of either type of collateral. However, the
opportunity costs for the bank of using liquid vs. illiquid collateral diﬀer. The use
of illiquid collateral generates no opportunity cost, while the use of liquid collateral
causes a positive opportunity cost (in terms of foregone net interest). For qi ≥ 0,
we denote by coppi (qi) ≥ 0 bank i’s exogenous marginal opportunity cost of using a
total of qi = qPi +qSi of liquid collateral for refinancing purposes in either the primary
or in the secondary market. Under the assumptions made, it is clearly a dominant
strategy for each bank to use liquid collateral only in the interbank market, to avoid
the opportunity costs in transactions vis-à-vis the central bank.
The secondary market will be modeled in reduced form, reflecting anecdotal evi-
dence on interbank conditions.12 Specifically, any bank i = 1, ..., n with a remaining
liquidity demand of qSi > 0 obtains funding up to the required amount at the mar-
ginal borrowing rate rS + criski (qSi ), where criski (qSi ) ≥ 0 denotes a mark-up (covering,
for instance, lenders’ risk controlling) on the exogenous risk-free rate rS ≥ 0. We will
write ci(qSi ) = criski (qSi )+c
opp
i (q
S
i ) for bank i’s eﬀective marginal cost of funding above
the risk-free rate. Conversely, any bank k = n+1, ..., N with excess liquidity earns,
net of the mark-up, only rS. For convenience, we assume that collateral pledged
by a borrower of reserves does not generate any value for the cash-rich lender (in
addition, of course, to securing the respective credit transaction).
It turns out to be useful at this point to derive bidders’ marginal valuations
for quantities obtained in the primary market. The intuition is as follows. As an
12We conjecture that a model of reserve management in the tradition of Poole (1968) would lead
to similar conclusions.
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unsuccessful bidder must make use of increasingly more expensive collateral in the
secondary market, while inexpensive collateral can be used for funding obtained
through the auction, marginal valuations will be strictly declining over a range of
quantities. To keep the analysis simple, we will assume henceforth that criski (.) and
coppi (.) are linear with c
risk
i (0) = c
opp
i (0) = 0. In this case, ∂ci/∂qi is a constant,
which we assume to be positive.
Proposition 1. Fix some bank i with liquidity demand q0i > 0. Then, with ex-post
choice of collateral, bank i’s marginal valuation for quantities qPi ≥ 0 in the primary
market is given by
vi(qPi ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
vi −
qPi
Bi
for 0 ≤ qPi ≤ q0i
rS for qPi > q0i ,
(2)
where vi = rS + ci(q0i ) and Bi = (∂ci/∂qi)−1.
Figure 1 shows, among other things, the graph of a marginal valuation function - place
Figure
1
about
here -
for a counterparty with liquidity demand. The interest rate vi corresponds to the
maximum rate that counterparty i, when relying exclusively on secondary market
funding, would be willing to pay for the first marginal unit of credit from the central
bank, collateralized by illiquid collateral. A higher liquidity demand q0i shifts bank
i’s marginal valuation function rightward as more of the expensive liquid collateral
needs to be used following an unchanged allotment. Similarly, a more abundant
availability of liquid collateral (i.e., a higher Bi) makes marginal valuations respond
in a less pronounced fashion to the allotment in the tender, so that marginal valua-
tions will be flatter.
For a counterparty k with excess liquidity eq0k ≤ 0, the market environment
implies constant marginal valuations. This is quite useful because it allows us to
abstract from potential entry by liquidity-rich banks. Indeed, unless the stop-out
rate in the auction falls below rS, banks with excess liquidity cannot earn any profits
from participating in the auction. We may therefore assume without much loss of
generality that only banks i = 1, ..., n choose to participate. Moreover, for simplicity,
we assume that n is common knowledge among market participants.13
Next, we describe the auction itself. The tender mechanism asks each counter-
party i to submit a schedule of cumulated bids that specifies, for any interest rate
r ≥ rmin, a quantity xi(r) ≥ 0 that bidder i is willing to buy at rate r. Here,
13Empirically, there is ample evidence that a bidder with a liquidity demand (with excess liquid-
ity) is more (less) likely to participate in the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations (see Bruno
et al., 2005, Craig and Fecht, 2007, and Fecht et al., 2007).
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rmin is the central bank’s reserve price (or minimum bid rate). For expositional
simplicity, we will assume throughout that rS = rmin.14 A schedule xi(.) is called
admissible if xi(.) is non-increasing, left-continuous, and if xi(r) = 0 for any suﬃ-
ciently high r.15 Only admissible bid schedules are accepted by the central bank.
Let x(r) =
Pn
i=1 xi(r) denote the aggregate cumulated bid at interest rate r.
We assume that the liquidity positions eq0k of banks k = n+ 1, ..., N with excess
liquidity are unobservable for the bidders at date 1. Instead, bidders hold a common
belief about the statistical distribution of the total allotment eQ following date 0.
For a given realization of eQ, let R∗( eQ) = {r ≥ rmin|x(r) ≤ eQ} denote the set
of interest rates at which aggregate cumulated bids can be satisfied with eQ. It is
straightforward to check that R∗( eQ) is non-empty for any eQ ≥ 0 and for any vector
of admissible bid schedules (x1(.), ..., xn(.)). We may therefore define the stop-out
rate as the infimum r∗( eQ) = inf R∗( eQ) of such interest rates. The allotment q∗i ( eQ)
to bidder i = 1, ..., n is then determined by satisfying all bids strictly above the stop-
out rate, and by applying rationing at the margin, if necessary.16 For eQ given, the
resulting tuple (r∗, q∗1, ..., q∗n) consisting of stop-out rate and individual allotments
will be referred to as the outcome of the tender.
IV. Uniform pricing
This section derives the equilibrium in the auction with uniform pricing. The
uniform-price auction is very well accessible to the mathematical analysis, and will
mainly serve as a point of comparison.
In the uniform-price tender, bidder i pays the stop-out rate r∗ per marginal unit,
so that bidder i’s net interest from an outcome (r∗, q∗1, ..., q∗n) is given by
Πui =
Z q∗i
0
{vi(qi)− r∗}dqi.
Figure 1 illustrates bidder i’s net interest under the uniform pricing rule as the
shaded area between marginal valuation and stop-out rate. The optimal schedule
for bidder i is determined by the uncertainty about the residual supply curve. In
our model, supply is perfectly inelastic, while bid schedules are downward sloping.
Hence, the residual supply for a given bidder, defined as the horizontal diﬀerence
between supply eQ and the aggregate of the bid schedules submitted by other coun-
terparties, must be increasing in the interest rate.
To ensure tractability, we will assume henceforth a common maximum valuation
v = v1 = ... = vn. Figure 1 suggests that it will then be suboptimal for a coun-
14This assumption can be dropped when the total allotment is suitably bounded relative to
bidders’ aggregate demand.
15By definition, the bid schedule xi(.) is left-continuous if limr0→r,r0<rxi(r0) = xi(r) for all r.
16A mathematical description of the allotment rule can be found in Appendix C.
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terparty to bid a strictly positive quantity at r > v. On the other hand, it is clear
that a zero quantity bid at any interest rate r < v will be dominated. Therefore,
given the linear set-up, a natural candidate for an equilibrium strategy is to scale
down actual demand di(r) = Bimax{v − r, 0} by a constant factor, so that the bid
schedule attains the form
xi(r) = Bui max{v − r, 0} (3)
for some constant Bui > 0. In the context of a uniform-price auction, an equilibrium
in which all bidders i = 1, ..., n use some schedule of the form (3) will be referred to
as a linear equilibrium. Motivated by the anecdotal evidence on bid curves oﬀered
in Appendix B, but also by restrictions imposed by tractability, we will focus the
analysis on the linear case.
To derive the equilibrium, we follow the approach used by Kyle (1989), Klemperer
and Meyer (1989), Back and Zender (1993), and others, which relies on the intuition
that if the quantity to be transacted is uncertain for the bidders, then the optimal
bidding strategy for the uniform pricing rule can essentially be found by a state-by-
state optimization against the ex-post residual supply curve. We will assume in the
sequel that eQ has full support on some interval [0;Q], where Q > 0 is not too large.
The support restriction is useful because it ensures that the stop-out rate does not
fall to the minimum bid rate in equilibrium with strictly positive probability, which
would engender overbidding at the minimum bid rate. We allow, however, for the
possibility that the stop-out rate drops to the minimum bid rate as the result of a
deviation by an individual bidder.
Proposition 2. Assume n ≥ 3, and that Q is not too large.17 Then there exists
a linear equilibrium in the auction with uniform pricing. In fact, the equilibrium is
unique within the class of linear equilibria. When compared to actual demand, bids
are shaded, i.e., Bui < Bi for all i. Moreover, in any equilibrium with heterogeneous
bidders, shading of bids is isotone, i.e., for all i 6= j we have Bui < Buj if and
only if Bi < Bj. In the symmetric set-up,18 the equilibrium is given by Bui /Bi =
(n− 2)/(n− 1) for all i.
The prediction of the model is consistent with general studies of bidding behavior in
uniform-price auctions such as Ausubel and Cramton (2002). Specifically, the bidder
17For just two bidders, there is no linear equilibrium with strictly decreasing bid schedules. In
this case, the residual supply curve is too steep to allow convergence of the dynamics of mutual
best responses.
18By a symmetric set-up, we mean a parameter constellation satisfying B = B1 = ... = Bn. This
implies, in particular, a common liquidity deficit q0 = q01 = ... = q
0
n.
12
has an incentive to shade actual demand because the stop-out rate will apply not
only to the marginal unit, but to the entire allotment to bidder i. In fact, bid shading
will be diﬀerential, i.e., shading will be the more pronounced at larger quantities
than at smaller quantities. This is only natural because for large quantities, the
overall price impact will be much stronger than for small quantities.
Next, we consider the case of a large auction by letting the number n of bidders go
to infinity. Throughout the analysis, it is tacitly understood that the total number
of counterparties N = N(n) depends on n and satisfies N(n) ≥ n + 1. For the
uniform auction, the following result is obtained.
Proposition 3. Consider a family of auctions {T (n)}n=3,4,5,... with uniform pricing,
such that in auction T (n), a random quantity not larger than Q(n) = nq is auctioned
oﬀ to n bidders, where q > 0. Assume that the slope parameters {Bi(n)}i=1,...,n are
uniformly bounded, i.e., there are B > B > 0 such that B ≤ Bi(n) ≤ B for
all n ≥ 3 and for all i = 1, ..., n. Assume also that q < B(v − rmin). Then
limn→∞Bui (n)/Bi(n) = 1 for all i.
Thus, provided that relative marginal valuations do not vary too widely across
bidders, bid shading is predicted to disappear under the uniform pricing rule in
large populations of bidders. This should be intuitive because with an increasing
number of bidders, the residual supply curve faced by an individual bidder becomes
flatter and flatter in the (q, r) diagram. As a consequence, the eﬀect of the individual
bid schedule on the stop-out rate will be smaller and smaller, inducing the bidder to
ask at a given interest rate for a quantity that is larger and closer to true demand. In
the limit, the residual supply curve is essentially a horizontal line, so that individual
bidders find it in their own interest to behave like price-takers, i.e., to submit their
true demand.
V. Discriminatory pricing
This section discusses bidding behavior in the auction with the discriminatory pric-
ing rule.
The reader will have noted that bid schedules can be formally described in two
ways, one expressing demand at given interest rates (the one used so far), and the
other attaching interest rates to given quantities. The discriminatory pricing rule
requires the payment of the individual bidder’s own interest rate bid on the allotted
quantities. It is therefore natural to work, rather than with the bid schedule xi(.)
itself, with the inverse schedule bi(.) defined via bi(qi) = inf{r ≥ rmin|xi(r) ≤ qi}.
The figure bi(qi) can then be understood as the stated willingness to pay (the “bid”)
for the marginal unit at quantity qi, contrasting the true willingness to pay for
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the marginal unit (the “valuation”), which is given by vi(qi). Similarly as in the
definition of the stop-out rate, one can check that bi(qi) is well-defined for any
admissible bid schedule xi(.) and any qi ≥ 0. Moreover, bi(.) is non-increasing and
right-continuous.
Under discriminatory pricing, bidder i pays his own bid bi(qi) for any marginal
unit, so that the resulting net interest from outcome (r∗, q∗1, ..., q∗n) amounts to
Πdi =
Z q∗i
0
{vi(qi)− bi(qi)}dqi. (4)
The integral corresponds to the shaded area in Figure 2 that illustrates the equilib-
rium in the discriminatory auction. Shown is one realization of the residual supply - place
Figure
2
about
here -
curve. The intersection point between counterparty i’s downward-sloping bid sched-
ule and the residual supply curve determines simultaneously the stop-out rate r∗ and
the allotment q∗i = xi(r∗) to bidder i. In contrast to the uniform-price auction, the
entire fulfilled part of the bid schedule determines the bidder’s profit, not just the
quantity demanded at the stop-out rate. This feature of the discriminatory auction
makes the general characterization of the equilibrium more involved so that we have
to restrict ourselves to the symmetric set-up.
Moreover, to obtain a linear equilibrium also under the discriminatory pricing
rule, a functional assumption on the uncertainty will be necessary. Fortunately, the
relevant class of distributions (those with a linear hazard ratio) captures relatively
well a bidder’s residual uncertainty about supply. Specifically, a random variable eQ
is considered that is distributed on the interval [0;Q] according to the density
f( eQ) = α
(Q− eQ)1−αQα ,
where α > 0. For α = 1, the distribution is uniform. For α < 1, the distribution of eQ
is skewed towards its “mode” Q, which should better correspond to the institutional
situation in the euro area.
The survey in Section II has shown that bidding behavior in the euro area de-
pends to a certain extent on the degree of uncertainty for the bidders. As mentioned
in the Introduction, we will be mainly interested in the case where there are many
bidders and uncertainty is non-negligible. In this case, it is plausible to assume that
the interest rate grid does not interfere too much with the bidder’s problem, and
may therefore be neglected. Equilibrium bidding is then characterized as follows.
Proposition 4. Assume n ≥ 2, and that bidders i = 1, ..., n have identical marginal
valuations vi(qi) = max{v − qi/B, rS}. Then, provided that α > 1/(n − 1), there
14
exists an equilibrium in the auction with discriminatory pricing in which bidder
i = 1, ..., n submits the piecewise linear bid schedule
xi(r) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 for r > vd,
Bd(vd − r) for rdmin < r ≤ vd,
B(v − r) for rmin ≤ r ≤ rdmin,
(5)
where
vd = v − Q
(n+ α(n− 1))B , (6)
Bd = (1 +
n
α(n− 1))B, (7)
rdmin = v −
Q
nB
, (8)
are the maximum interest rate bid, the absolute slope of the inverse bid schedule,
and the minimum stop-out rate, respectively.
Figures 1 and 2 jointly illustrate how and why bid shading diﬀers across auction for-
mats. With uniform pricing, bid schedules are steeper than actual demand, because
the level of inframarginal bids is without consequence for the bidder. With discrimi-
natory pricing, however, bid schedules are flatter than actual demand, because there
is little competition for inframarginal quantities. In Section VII, we will explore the
implications of this point for the central bank’s preferences concerning the pricing
rule. The shape of bid schedules under discriminatory pricing, taken for itself, will
play an important role in the next section when we compare the predictions of the
model with the evidence.
Equilibrium bidding diﬀers between the two auction formats also when there are
many bidders. Specifically, assume the quantity allotted is Q(n) = nq. Then, for an
increasing number of bidders the maximum interest rate at which a positive bid is
placed in the discriminatory auction converges from below against
lim
n→∞
vd(n) = v − q
(1 + α)B
. (9)
Thus, competition does move up the level of bids, but the eﬀect is not strong enough
to eliminate bid shading in the limit. This point, as well, will be taken up in the
next section.
VI. The case of the Eurosystem
This section compares the predictions for the discriminatory auction with the empir-
ical evidence. The topics surveyed in Section 2 will be treated one by one, keeping
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the original order. To ensure the validity of the equilibrium characterization illus-
trated in Figure 2, it will be assumed henceforth that α > 1/(n− 1).
(a) Primary vs. secondary market funding. Let eq = eQ/n denote the
per-bidder allotment in the auction with n bidders. In the absence of informational
frictions, interbank conditions following the allotment eq should roughly reflect coun-
terparties’ marginal willingness to pay for credit. We will therefore use the marginal
valuation v(eq) = rS + c(q0 − eq) as a proxy for (deposit or swap) interbank condi-
tions, where we dropped the reference to the individual bidder i for notational conve-
nience.19 For conditions in the primary market, the following terminology is adapted
from Bindseil et al. (2005). Denote by rmard (eq, n) the marginal interest rate (i.e., the
stop-out rate) in the discriminatory auction. Then, bid shading v(eq) − rmard (eq, n)
is defined as the diﬀerence between marginal valuation and marginal interest rate.
Similarly, let underpricing v(eq)− rward (eq, n) be the diﬀerence between the marginal
valuation and the quantity-weighted average winning rate rward (eq, n) = eq−1 R hq0 b(q)dq
in the discriminatory auction, where b(.) is the inverse bid schedule used in equi-
librium by all bidders. Finally, the discount v(eq) − q−1 R q
0
b(q)dq is the diﬀerence
between marginal valuation and the average equilibrium bid rate, where we ignore
the part of the bid schedule that is allotted with probability zero.
Proposition 5. In the linear equilibrium of the discriminatory auction with n
bidders, as described in Proposition 4, expected bid shading, expected underpricing,
and the expected discount are all strictly positive. Moreover, these spreads do not
vanish in the limit as n→∞.
To understand why bid shading does not disappear in the limit in the discriminatory
auction, it may be instructive to consider the bidder’s marginal costs of increasing
the expected allotment above the equilibrium amount. In equilibrium, these mar-
ginal costs must be the same for the (symmetric) uniform-price and discriminatory
auctions. Now, intuitively, to increase the expected allotment, the bidder would
have to raise the whole bid schedule. In fact, given that residual supply is flatter
in the discriminatory auction, we would expect that the rise of the bid schedule is
more pronounced in the case of uniform pricing.20 Nevertheless, and this is the cru-
cial point to note, the bidder’s expected costs of raising the bid schedule by, say one
basis point, is much lower under the uniform pricing rule than under the discrim-
inatory pricing rule. Indeed, the expected stop-out rate under the uniform-pricing
rule would increase by much less than one basis point, while the price impact is
19The allotment also determines the secured market rate rS + crisk(q0− eq), which may be higher
or lower than r∗, depending on the parameters of the model.
20This point can be verified without much additional eﬀort in the special case α = 1.
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immediate in the case of the discriminatory auction. Moreover, this eﬀect becomes
relatively stronger as the number of bidders increases.
(b) The loser’s nightmare. The evidence reviewed in Section II suggests
that bidders in Eurosystem auctions have an incentive to increase both the level of
their bids and bid dispersion when uncertainty increases. In the model, it is the
parameter α that measures the uncertainty about the allotment and equivalently
about the marginal valuation. Indeed, the normalized standard deviation of the
allotment
s =
p
E(eq2)−E(eq)2
E(eq) =
r
α
2 + α
is strictly increasing in α. Similarly, the variance of the marginal valuation
σ2 = E(v(eq)2)−E(v(eq))2 = αq2
(1 + α)2(2 + α)B2
is increasing in α provided that s < 0.48.21 The following comparative statics result
can be obtained.
Proposition 6. Consider a ceteris paribus increase in α < 1. Then the average
bid level (ignoring bids that are allotted with probability zero), the expected stop-out
rate, and the expected average winning rate all go up. However, the expected mar-
ginal valuation increases even more strongly, so that expected bid shading, expected
underpricing, and the expected discount all go up as well. The strict monotonicity
is valid throughout also in the limit as n→∞.
With an increase in uncertainty α, the middle section of the equilibrium bid schedule,
i.e., the section corresponding to positive allotments up to q, moves clockwise around
its right end point. This is intuitive because bids placed at lower quantities are
more likely to be competitive. In addition to higher (and more dispersed) bidding,
however, it becomes more likely that the allotment will be smaller than expected,
and that the realized marginal valuation is larger. This widens the spread between
marginal willingness to pay for credit and actual bids. Thus, concerning the impact
of volatility, the theoretical framework explains an increasing absolute level and
dispersion of bids, but is in conflict with bid levels increasing relative to secondary
market conditions.22
(c) The shape of bid schedules. Quite generally, the discriminatory pricing
rule implies that bid schedules are flatter than marginal valuations. To investigate
21This restriction should be satisfied in the euro area where allotments have been relatively
well-predictable most of the time.
22A potential explanation might be credit rationing that would drive a wedge between marginal
valuations and secondary market rates (see also Section IX).
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the determinants of the slope of the bid schedule, define bid dispersion ∆ as the
quantity-weighted standard deviation of the bid schedule, where we ignore bids that
are allotted with probability zero (as in the definition of the discount). Formally,
this definition amounts to
∆2 =
Z q
0
b(q)2dq − (
Z q
0
b(q)dq)2.
A simple calculation shows that the bid dispersion in the identified equilibrium of
the discriminatory auction is given by
∆d =
s
q
12B
α(n− 1)
n+ α(n− 1) . (10)
This formula implies that, for a given number of bidders, if the market environment
becomes more and more predictable, i.e., if α becomes smaller, bid schedules become
less and less dispersed. Furthermore, bid dispersion is declining in the liquidity of
collateral assets. All this is intuitive and consistent with the evidence.
The present discussion also allows seeing more clearly why some uncertainty
is needed to sustain the equilibrium in Proposition 4. Intuitively, the problem is
that if uncertainty about the allotment diminishes ceteris paribus, bidders would
submit excessively flat bid schedules. However, at some stage, provided that no
bidder submits bids above her marginal valuation, there would be an incentive for
a single bidder to undercut the standing bids of all the other bidders, which would
unravel the equilibrium. When individual bidders are small and uncertainty about
the allotment is non-negligible, however, the equilibrium is sustainable.
(d) The increase in the Eonia spread. The evidence surveyed in Section II
suggests that an increase of the tender size might imply an increased risk of ending
with insuﬃcient liquidity. The problem for commercial bank liquidity management
is then that with a higher probability, liquid collateral may become relatively scarce.
Intuitively, this should cause an increase of interest rates in the secondary market.
The following result can be obtained.
Proposition 7. Consider a simultaneous and proportional inflation of q and q0.
Then, in the considered equilibrium of the discriminatory auction, the expected stop-
out rate, the expected average winning rate, the expected marginal valuation, and
the standard deviation of the marginal valuation all increase. Moreover, expected
bid shading, expected underpricing, the expected discount, and bid dispersion all
increase. The respective strict monotonicity holds also in the limit as n→∞.
In particular, Proposition 7 predicts that a rise in the tender size driven by ex-
ogenous changes in the operational framework should increase expected rates both
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in the tender and in the interbank market. Such an exogenous change might have
occurred when the Eurosystem modified its operational framework in spring 2004,
with an accompanying eﬀect of approximately doubling the size of its weekly main
refinancing operations.
VII. Discriminatory vs. uniform pricing
What are the relative merits of using uniform vs. discriminatory pricing in central
bank tenders? This section will compare the two auction formats with respect
to expected revenues, expected costs of remuneration (as explained below), and
signaling.
In the dimension of expected revenues, our earlier findings support the intuition
that for many bidders, declining valuations, and aggregate uncertainty, the uniform-
price auction resembles a second-price auction for an indivisible good, which should
induce bidders to submit their true valuations. Yet regarding the revenue compari-
son, there is a countervailing eﬀect that for relatively large allotments, discriminatory
pricing generates higher revenues than uniform pricing. As our next result will show,
this latter eﬀect always dominates the bid shading in our framework. To state the
proposition, we introduce the following notation. For a given per-bidder allotmenteq, let πu(eq, n) = neqrwaru (eq, n) and πd(eq, n) = neqrward (eq, n), respectively, denote the
realized revenues in the uniform-price and discriminatory auction, where rwaru (eq, n)
is defined for the uniform-price auction in analogy to rward (eq, n).
Proposition 8. Consider the symmetric linear equilibria described in Propositions
2 and 4. Then for n ≥ 3, we have E(πd(eq, n)) > E(πu(eq, n)). The inequality is
strict also in the limit as n→∞.
Thus, in our model, the discriminatory auctions yields strictly higher expected rev-
enues than the uniform-price auction.
It must be noted, though, that in the case of the Eurosystem auctions, central
bank income diﬀers from revenues. Background is the institutional peculiarity that
in the euro area, in contrast to the reserve system used so far in the U.S., required
reserves are remunerated. The idea here is to reimburse commercial banks the cost
of holding liquid means equivalent in size to minimum reserves. In the euro area,
remuneration is based on the marginal tender rate. To study the impact of remuner-
ation formally, let L ≥ 0 denote counterparties’ common level of minimum reserves.
Remuneration implies that following a total allotment of eQ, each counterparty ob-
tains an additional net interest of Lr∗( eQ). We are interested therefore in the relative
level of the expected stop-out rate under the two auction formats.
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Two eﬀects determine equilibrium remuneration. First, there is a direct impact
of the pricing rule on the average level of the marginal tender rate. It turns out that
also with remuneration, the marginal tender rate is typically higher with uniform
pricing, unless the market environment is relatively calm. Second, the remuneration
itself increases the average level of bids. In our model, this eﬀect is always stronger
with uniform pricing than with discriminatory pricing. Clearly, the second, strategic
eﬀect disappears as the number of bidders grows larger. The following result can be
obtained:
Proposition 9. Consider a symmetric set-up with n ≥ 3 bidders. Then, with
remuneration of individual reserve requirements L ≥ 0 at the level of the stop-out
rate, there exist linear equilibria in the uniform-price and discriminatory auctions
generalizing those described in Propositions 2 and 4. Specifically, with remuneration,
bidders bid as if v were replaced by v(L), where
v(L) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
v + L
(n−2)B for uniform pricing,
v + αLB(n+α(n−1)) for discriminatory pricing.
In these equilibria, for n ≥ 4, there exists a threshold value α∗ ∈ (0; 1) such that
E(rmaru (eq, n)) > E(rmard (eq, n)) if and only if α > α∗. Moreover, when α is fixed,
E(rmaru (eq, n)) − E(rmard (eq, n)) becomes strictly positive for suﬃciently large n and
does not vanish in the limit as n→∞.
Thus, with aggregate uncertainty and many bidders, the expected remuneration
payment might indeed be smaller for the central bank when the discriminatory
format is employed.
While Propositions 8 and 9 suggest a revenue motive, there are alternative rea-
sons for the monetary authority to rely on the discriminatory format. The most
obvious one is that the large discriminatory auction produces stop-out rates that,
compared to the uniform-price auction, are on average much closer to the main
policy rate rS. Furthermore, the stop-out in the discriminatory format is much
less volatile than in the uniform-price format. These properties of the discrimina-
tory auction may be relevant for the central bank when the market interprets the
marginal tender rate as a signal concerning monetary policy. Our analysis might
therefore explain why, even when revenue maximization is not the primary objec-
tive, the discriminatory pricing rule has been used almost exclusively in the main
refinancing operations of the Eurosystem.23
23Maybe interestingly, our findings are also consistent with the view that overly high prices
produced by the Dutch pricing rule have been the main motivation for the Bundesbank to switch
to the American pricing rule in fall 1988 (cf. Nautz, 1997).
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VIII. Related theoretical literature
In his path-breaking paper on auctions of shares, Wilson (1979) oﬀers an explicit
analysis of the uniform-price auction under constant marginal valuations and incom-
plete information. Back and Zender (1993) characterize bidding equilibria also for
the discriminatory auction, assuming likewise constant marginal valuations. This al-
lows them to compare revenues between pricing rules and to comment on the policy
discussion concerning U.S. Treasury auctions.24
Klemperer and Meyer (1989) consider a reverse auction in which profit-maxi-
mizing oligopolists select supply functions in the presence of uncertainty about mar-
ket demand. Our discussion of auctions with uniform pricing in Section IV is closely
related to their analysis. Specifically, Proposition 3 extends a special case of Klem-
perer and Meyer’s Proposition 8a (linear demand withm = 0) by allowing for bidder
heterogeneity. We also oﬀer an explicit treatment of the non-negativity requirement
for quantities. Moreover, our model allows for an optional (lower) price cap. Fi-
nally, Section V in our paper can be understood as an adaptation of Klemperer
and Meyer’s model to the case of discriminatory pricing. Ausubel and Cramton
(2002) also assume declining marginal valuations and show in particular that the
incentives for diﬀerential bid shading may cause an allocational ineﬃciency in the
uniform-price auction. Our findings illustrate their analysis by discussing specific
equilibria with decreasing returns in both the uniform-price and the discriminatory
auction.25
The structure of the equilibrium prediction is known to change when the auc-
tioneer adjusts supply in response to incoming bids (see Lengwiler, 1999, Back and
Zender, 2001, and McAdams, 2007). This practice, however, is apparently not ap-
plied by the Eurosystem (cf. Appendix A).
Independent characterizations of bidding behavior in the primary market that,
while diﬀerent in interpretation, are structurally similar to our results have been
given by Röell (1998) and Biais et al. (2000) in the context of adverse selection and
by Viswanathan and Wang (2002) in the context of risk aversion. Our eventual
generalization to distributions with a linear hazard ratio in Section V draws on
Viswanathan and Wang’s work. Hortaçsu (2002) considers a share auction with
discriminatory pricing for two bidders and an exponential distribution of types.
For a heterogeneous population of bidders, Menezes and Monteiro (1995) show the
24For an overview over this debate, see also Bikhchandani and Huang (1993) and more recently,
Goldreich (2007). Much of the research on multi-unit auctions relates to Friedman’s (1960) famous
advocacy of the uniform-price auction.
25There exists a closely related literature on auctions of finitely many identical goods. See
Krishna (2002, Chapters 12-14) and references given therein.
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impossibility of an equilibrium in a discriminatory bidding game.26
IX. Predictions for the credit crunch
The euro money market was hit by the U.S. subprime crisis in the first half of August
2007. To investigate incentives for bidding during a liquidity crisis, we consider now
a sudden exogenous development through which collateral assets held by commercial
banks become less liquid, or equivalently, a development through which the use of
liquid collateral causes higher marginal opportunity costs.
In the model, this type of exogenous shock corresponds to a decrease of collateral
quality B. The ceteris paribus impact of this change would be, as suggested by
Proposition 1, that banks with a net liquidity demand would have strongly increased
marginal valuations for central bank credit. Moreover, marginal valuations of these
banks would decline more sharply than before, reflecting the counterparty’s primary
goal of satisfying its minimum reserve requirement. The resulting predictions are as
follows.
Proposition 10. A ceteris paribus drop in collateral quality from B down to B0 < B
has the same consequences on tender rates and marginal valuations as a proportional
inflation of q and q0 by the factor B/B0 > 1.
Thus, as in Proposition 7, the average level of tender rates goes up, there is a rise in
marginal valuations, bids are more dispersed, and there is more volatility in marginal
valuations. All this is largely in line with anecdotal evidence that is available at the
time of writing, and suggests that the general conclusions that can be drawn from
the model hold also during a turmoil period.
A puzzle remains, however. Specifically, towards the end of the year 2007, banks
apparently were willing to pay a premium for an allotment in the ECB’s repo auc-
tions. More precisely, while tender rates went higher and higher, market benchmarks
such as Eonia and 1-week Eonia swap remained at relatively moderate levels (cf. Cas-
sola and Morana, 2008). Thus, during this period, bidders’ marginal willingness to
pay for credit following the tenders must have been much higher than suggested by
secondary market rates.27
26Building on the early contribution by Smith (1966), the analysis of Nautz (1995) studies
optimal bidding in divisible-good auctions, where bidders face an exogenous uncertainty about the
stop-out rate. As the present analysis shows, however, even with many bidders, the equilibrium
distribution of the stop-out rate in repo auctions depends on several factors including the pricing
rule, the degree of uncertainty, the remuneration scheme, and the liquidity of the available collateral
assets.
27The most natural explanation of this fact is asymmetric information in the secondary market,
but incorporating this consideration more explicitly would go beyond the scope of the present
analysis.
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X. Conclusion
Refinancing operations are large-scale financial auctions that are used by central
banks such as the ECB to provide an appropriate amount of reserves to the banking
sector. The present paper has oﬀered a model of refinancing operations in the
context of a reduced-form market for interbank credit. In the model, the central
bank invites a finite number of counterparties to submit schedules of bids, and only
the highest bids will be successful. Counterparties that end up with insuﬃcient
funding from the auction must turn to the secondary market where credit can be
obtained only against the most expensive sorts of collateral.
We have used the model to investigate the weekly main refinancing operations
conducted by the Eurosystem following June 2000. Four stylized facts have been
analyzed. First, concerning the spread between primary and secondary market con-
ditions, we found that bid shading is persistent in large discriminatory auctions,
provided that aggregate uncertainty about the allotment does not vanish in the
limit. This suggests a new explanation of the interest rate spread. We also analyzed
in some depth the intricate issue of how uncertainty influences bidding behavior in
repo auctions. Here our model predicts that both the absolute level of bids and
their dispersion increase in the volatility of the expected market rate. Also this
finding is largely consistent with the evidence, i.e., with the hypothesis of the loser’s
nightmare. A third regularity that turned out to be reflected in the equilibrium
prediction is the flatness of bid schedules during calm periods. Finally, we looked at
the “mysterious” increase of the Eonia spread following March 2004, and can oﬀer
also here a theoretical prediction that is consistent with the evidence.
We then discussed the question why the ECB has been relying mostly on the
discriminatory format in its main refinancing operations. We could show that with
suﬃciently many bidders, expected revenues are strictly higher under the discrimina-
tory format than under the uniform-price format, despite the more pronounced bid
shading. This revenue dominance may even become stronger when the central bank
has chosen to reimburse interest paid on required holdings of reserves. However, we
have also shown that tender rates in the discriminatory format are on average closer
to the main policy rate (and less noisy), which might even be more relevant from a
policy perspective.
Finally, motivated by the credit crunch following August 2007, we derived the
implications of a deterioration of collateral quality on equilibrium bid schedules and
the bidder’s marginal willingness to pay for credit after the auction. Here we found
the prediction that illiquidity of collateral not only increases the average level of
both tender rates and marginal valuations, but also bid dispersion and the volatility
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of marginal valuations. These general conclusions suggest that the model can also
be used to study bidding behavior during a liquidity crisis.
Appendix A. Institutional background
This appendix provides some basic information on the euro money market and the
repo auctions conducted by the Eurosystem. For a more thorough description of the
implementation framework in the euro area, the reader is referred to ECB (2006).
From the perspective of the Eurosystem, there is a well-defined set of market par-
ticipants in the euro money market, the so-called eligible counterparties. A counter-
party’s demand for (or supply of) liquidity is determined by several factors including
reserve requirements, precautionary demand, and idiosyncratic liquidity flows (cf.,
e.g., Poole, 1968). In fact, in the euro area, precautionary demand plays a subor-
dinated role and is largely dominated by reserve requirements (see, e.g., Bindseil et
al., 2003).
Required reserves must be held on average over the so-called reserve maintenance
period, which is usually one month. To allow counterparties to collectively satisfy
their reserve requirements, the Eurosystem provides liquidity to the banking sys-
tem through so-called refinancing operations. From a volume perspective, the most
relevant of those have been the main refinancing operations and the longer-term
refinancing operations. Main (longer-term) refinancing operations are conducted
on a weekly (monthly) basis to provide liquidity to eligible counterparties over a
one-week (three-month) horizon.
In its main refinancing operations, the ECB applies a so-called neutral allotment
policy which aims at compensating aggregate liquidity imbalances in the banking
system (cf. Ewerhart et al., 2008). Deviations from this rule occurred in particular
in consequence of tender imbalances, in response to persistent changes of the EONIA
spread, and in the context of widespread percussions of liquidity conditions, such
as in September 2001 and more recently following August 2007. However, there is
no evidence suggesting that the ECB would make the total allotment dependent on
incoming bids (cf. Ejerskov et al., 2008).
All central bank lending to the counterparties of the Eurosystem has to be se-
cured by eligible collateral. A very broad range of collateral assets is accepted by the
Eurosystem, including government bonds, stocks, bank bonds, credit claims, asset-
backed securities, and other assets. Should a counterparty fail to transfer collateral,
the relevant allotment would not be made, and a penalty would be imposed upon
the counterparty. The ECB may decide then to counteract the resulting liquidity
imbalance by a so-called fine-tuning operation.
The oﬃcial documentation describes three basic auction formats. Apart from
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the fixed-rate tender, which is just a proportional rationing scheme, the Eurosystem
may use the variable-rate tender with either the Dutch (i.e., uniform-price) or the
American (discriminatory or pay-your-bid) pricing rule. In the main refinancing
operations, the uniform pricing rule has been used only at the very start of Stage III
of EMU. Subsequently, the Eurosystem relied upon the fixed-rate tender for nearly
one year and a half. In June 2000, however, the fixed-rate tender was abandoned
and replaced by the American tender, which has been used since then.
In these discriminatory main refinancing operations, yet not in the longer-term
operations, the ECB has chosen to apply a bid floor, the so-calledminimum bid rate,
which has taken over the role of the most prominent policy rate from the rate in
the fixed-rate tenders. The minimum bid rate has always been the midpoint of the
interest rate corridor formed by the so-called marginal lending and deposit rates.
Themarginal rate (or stop-out rate) is the lowest rate at which allotments are made.
The weighted average rate is the quantity-weighted average of the interest rate of
(the allotted fractions of) successful bids.28
The Eurosystem grants remuneration of minimum reserve requirements. Specifi-
cally, following the completion of a given reserve maintenance period, a counterparty
receives an interest payment on its minimum reserve requirement, where the rate
applied equals the average of the marginal rates in the main refinancing operations
of that maintenance period.
Important secondary market rates include the Eonia, Euribor, Eurepo, and the
Eonia swap rate. The euro overnight interest rate Eonia is the market index for
unsecured overnight interbank lending, computed from the report of panel institu-
tions as a weighted average of contractual rates. The euro interbank oﬀered rate
Euribor is a maturity bundle of term rates at which a prime bank would be willing
to lend euro funds to another prime bank, and is computed as the average of the
oﬀer rates of a representative panel of prime banks. Eurepo is a similar maturity
bundle of indices for repurchase agreements involving standard (GC) collateral. The
swap rate is the market price, with respect to various maturities, for a contract that
exchanges fixed against Eonia interest rate payments (cf. Ewerhart et al., 2007).
Appendix B. Bid curves and linearity
This appendix oﬀers some anecdotal evidence on bid schedules. Figure 3 shows - place
Figure
3
about
here -
aggregate bid schedules and supply in four main refinancing operations during the
period 2005-2006. The selected examples are typical for a market environment that
28On an operational level, eligible counterparties may submit up to ten bids, each consisting of
a pairs of interest rate and quantity. The interest rate in each bid must be a multiple of 1 basis
point. There is a similar grid of EUR 0.1 m on the quantity scale, yet this grid is less visible in
the data. There is also a minimum amount of EUR 1 m on each interest rate/quantity pair.
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is characterized by a certain degree of uncertainty. Bid curves for calmer periods
look similar, but are less informative because of the interest rate grid. It can be
seen that the bid curves share a characteristic shape with a lengthy and relatively
flat middle section that is almost a straight line. The examples shown in Figure 3
therefore suggest that on an aggregate basis, the linear equilibrium is largely in line
with actual bidding behavior. For additional information on bid schedules, we refer
the reader to the empirical literature surveyed in Subsection II(b).
Appendix C. Mathematical description of the allotment rule
This appendix oﬀers a mathematical description of the allotment rule in the auction
model. The description is actually straightforward provided that all participants
i = 1, ..., n use inverse bid schedules bi(.) that are strictly declining in quantity. In
that case, the allotment to bidder i in the auction will just be stated demand xi(r∗) at
the stop-out rate. However, if the inverse bid schedule of at least one bidder happens
to possess a flat section, there will be a discontinuity in the aggregate bid schedule
x(.), so that demand may strictly exceed supply at the stop-out rate. Despite the
discontinuity, the situation still remains relatively simple provided that only a single
bidder, say bidder i0, submits an inverse bid schedule with a flat section. In that
case, all bidders i 6= i0 will just obtain a regular allotment of xi(r∗), with rationing
being applied exclusively to bidder i0 who obtains simply the residual supply at the
stop-out rate. For our analysis, this is all what may happen in response to a single
bidder’s deviation from equilibrium behavior involving strictly declining inverse bid
schedules.
Thus, all of our results are valid for any allotment rule that fully allots bids at
rates strictly above the stop-out rate. For completeness, we shall now fully specify
the one allotment rule with this property that in addition implements proportional
rationing at the margin. In doing so, we have to allow for the possibility that more
than one bidder submits an inverse bid schedule with a flat section. Two cases
must be distinguished. Consider first that case that aggregate bids weakly exceed
supply, i.e., that x(rmin) ≥ eQ. Define then x+i (r∗) = limr→r∗,r>r∗ xi(r) as bidder
i’s cumulated bid at an interest rate just above r∗, and let x+(r∗) =
Pn
j=1 x
+
j (r
∗)
denote the corresponding aggregate. In this case, bidder i obtains an allotment
q∗i ( eQ) = x+i (r∗( eQ)) + xi(r∗( eQ))− x+i (r∗( eQ))x(r∗( eQ))− x+(r∗( eQ)) { eQ− x+(r∗( eQ))}
in state eQ, where the ratio is understood to be one if the denominator vanishes.
Thus, if aggregate cumulated bids exceed supply then the allotment is composed of
a complete allocation of the part of the bid schedule located strictly above the stop-
out rate, and a pro-rata allocation of any flat segment of the bid schedule located
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at the stop-out rate. In the underbidding case x(rmin) < eQ, all bids are satisfied, so
that the allotment to bidder i amounts to q∗i ( eQ) = xi(rmin). The thereby specified
allotment rule is applied likewise in the uniform-price and the discriminatory auction.
Appendix D. Proofs
This appendix contains formal proofs of Propositions 1 through 10.
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume that bidder i obtains an allotment qPi in the
primary market. Then, for 0 ≤ qPi ≤ q0i , the total net interest paid for funding in
the secondary market amounts to
Ci(qPi ) = r
S(q0i − qPi ) +
Z q0i−qPi
0
ci(qi)dqi.
Hence, the marginal valuation in the primary market is given by
vi(qPi ) = −C 0i(qPi ) = rS + ci(q0i − qPi ) = vi −
qPi
B
.
For qPi > q0i , bidder i uses illiquid collateral in the primary market, and oﬀers excess
funds qPi − q0i in the secured market at rate rS. This proves (2). ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. Keep i ∈ {1, ..., n} fixed, and assume that each bidder
j 6= i submits a schedule xj(.), where xj(r) = Buj max{v − r, 0} for some Buj > 0.
Let Bu−i =
P
j 6=iB
u
j . Assume that bidder i uses an admissible bid schedule xi(.), and
consider state eQ. It will be shown first that any interest-rate quantity combination
(r, qi) = (r∗( eQ), q∗i ( eQ)) resulting from (x1(.), ..., xn(.)) in state eQ under the uniform
pricing rule satisfies precisely one of the following three conditions:
(i) r > v and qi = eQ
(ii) rmin < r ≤ v and qi = eQ− (v − r)Bu−i ≥ 0
(iii) r = rmin and 0 ≤ qi ≤ eQ− vBu−i
Clearly, if x(0) ≤ eQ, then r∗( eQ) = rmin and condition (iii) is satisfied. Assume
therefore x(0) > eQ. Since bidder i is the only bidder with a potentially discontinuous
bid schedule,
q∗i ( eQ) = x+i (r∗( eQ)) + eQ− x+(r∗( eQ))
= eQ−X
j 6=i
x+j (r
∗( eQ))
= eQ−X
j 6=i
xj(r∗( eQ)).
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This implies that either (i), (ii), or (iii) will be satisfied, and proves the assertion.
Next, we show that schedule (3) with
Bui =
BiBu−i
Bi +Bu−i
(11)
is ex-post optimal for bidder i, provided that
Q ≤ v(Bui +Bu−i). (12)
Fix eQ ∈ [0;Q]. With the linear specification, bidder i’s net interest is given by
Πui =
Z q∗i
0
{vi(qi)− r∗}dqi = q∗i {v − r∗ −
q∗i
2Bi
}, (13)
where r∗ = r∗( eQ) and q∗i = q∗i ( eQ). Selecting a point (r∗, q∗i ) satisfying (i) obviously
cannot be optimal. Moreover, from (12) it follows that among the points (r, qi)
satisfying condition (iii), the profit-maximizing alternative would entail a quantity
q∗i = eQ− vBu−i. Thus, q∗i + (v− r∗)Bu−i = eQ with r∗ ∈ [0; v]. Implicit diﬀerentiation
delivers dq∗i /dr∗ = Bu−i. Using this in the first-order condition resulting from (13)
yields the assertion. Now, we show that system (11), for n ≥ 3 and for i = 1, ..., n,
has the unique solution
Bui = Bi +
Bu∗
2
−
r
B2i + (
Bu∗
2
)2, (14)
where the parameter Bu∗ is the unique strictly positive root of the equation
Bu∗
2
− 1
n− 2
nX
i=1
{
r
B2i + (
Bu∗
2
)2 −Bi} = 0. (15)
Define Bu∗ =
Pn
i=1B
u
i . Using this notation, condition (11) can be rewritten as
(Bi −Bui )(Bu∗ −Bui ) = BiBui . Solving for Bui yields
Bui = Bi +
Bu∗
2
±
r
(Bi +
Bu∗
2
)2 −Bu∗Bi.
However, only the negative root is economically relevant because otherwise Bui > Bi,
which would contradict (11). This delivers (14). Summing up over all i = 1, ..., n,
and rearranging yields (15). To see why (15) has a unique strictly positive root, note
that the equation is certainly satisfied for Bu∗ = 0. The left-hand side of (15) has a
strictly positive first derivative in Bu∗ = 0, and is strictly concave for all Bu∗ ≥ 0, so
there is at most one root Bu∗ > 0. Using (14), this proves uniqueness. On the other
hand, for n ≥ 3 fixed, the left-hand side of (15) follows the asymptotics
Bu∗
2
− 1
n− 2
nX
i=1
{
r
B2i + (
Bu∗
2
)2 −Bi} ∼ − B
u
∗
n− 2 as B
u
∗ →∞,
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and therefore eventually becomes negative for a suﬃciently large Bu∗ . Invoking the
intermediate value theorem proves existence, and thereby the assertion. Clearly, we
have Bui < Bi. Moreover, the right-hand side of (14) is strictly increasing in Bi,
which delivers the monotonicity of equilibrium bids in heterogeneous populations of
bidders. The assertion concerning the symmetric case is immediate from (14) and
(15). ¤
Proof of Proposition 3. Fix n ≥ 3. Without loss of generality, B1(n) ≤ Bi(n) for
all i = 1, ..., n. From the proof of Proposition 2, we know that the slope parameters
Bu1 (n), ..., Bun(n) are characterized uniquely by (11). Monotonicity implies Bu1 (n) ≤
Bui (n) for all i = 1, ..., n. In particular, one has Bu−i(n) ≥ (n − 1)Bu1 (n) for any i.
Using (11), one obtains
Bu1 (n)
B1(n)
= 1− B
u
1 (n)
Bu−1(n)
≥ n− 2
n− 1 .
But then,
Bu−i(n) ≥ (n− 1)Bu1 (n) ≥ (n− 2)B1(n) ≥ (n− 2)B.
Using (11) again, one finds
Bui (n)
Bi(n)
≥ 1− B
u
i (n)
(n− 2)B ≥ 1−
Bi(n)
(n− 2)B ≥ 1−
B
(n− 2)B = 1− εn,
where εn → 0 for n→∞. But then, for n suﬃciently large,
Q(n) = nq < nv
B
1− εn
≤ v
nX
i=1
Bi(n)
1− εn
≤ v
nX
i=1
Bui (n),
so that Proposition 2 guarantees the existence of the linear equilibrium. Considering
the limit for n→∞ yields the assertion. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4. Fix i and assume that bidders j 6= i use a common
continuous bid schedule of the form (5) for parameter values vd, Bd, and rdmin satis-
fying rmin ≤ rdmin < vd and Bd(vd − rdmin) = B(v − rdmin). We will derive the optimal
admissible response xi(r) of bidder i. Denoting bidder i’s inverse bid schedule by
bi(qi), expected net interest for bidder i is given by
E(Πdi ) =
Z Q
0
Z q∗i ( hQ)
0
(vi(qi)− bi(qi))dqidF ( eQ),
where F ( eQ) = 1− (1− ( eQ/Q))α denotes the cumulative distribution function of eQ.
Write Q(qi) = { eQ ∈ [0;Q]|q∗i ( eQ) ≥ qi} for the set of total allotments such that the
allotment to bidder i is at least qi. Then, changing the order of integration yields
E(Πdi ) =
Z Q
0
pr{Q(qi)}(vi(qi)− bi(qi))dqi, (16)
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where pr{Q(qi)} =
R
Q(qi)
dF ( eQ) is the probability that bidder i receives an allot-
ment of at least qi. Since the schedules xj(.) of bidders j 6= i are continuous, and
the weakly decreasing inverse bid schedule bi(.) is necessarily continuous almost
everywhere,
pr{Q(qi)} = 1− F (qi +
X
j 6=i
xj(bi))
for almost every qi. We drop for the moment the admissibility requirement on xi(.),
and search for a pointwise maximizer b∗i (.) of the integrand
I(bi, qi) = pr{Q(qi)}(vi(qi)− bi) (17)
in (16). Consider first qi ∈ [0; q]. Clearly, b∗i (qi) ≤ vd because otherwise, lowering
b∗i (qi) marginally would increase I(bi, qi). In the case rdmin ≤ bi ≤ vd,
pr{Q(qi)} = Q−α(Q− qi − (n− 1)(vd − bi)Bd)α (18)
for almost any qi ∈ [0; q]. Provided that (18) holds, the first-order condition has the
unique solution
b∗i (qi) =
α(v − qi/B) + vd
1 + α
− Q− qi
(1 + α)(n− 1)Bd . (19)
Comparing (19) with b∗i (qi) = vd−qi/Bd yields first (7) and then (6). Since qi ∈ [0; q],
this implies b∗i (qi) ∈ [rdmin; vd], where
rdmin = v
d − q
Bd
= v − q
B
> v − q
0
B
= rmin
is a consequence of (1) and (2). Moreover, a straightforward calculation exploiting
the first-order condition delivers
∂2I
∂b2i
(b∗i (qi), qi) = −(n− 1)Bd
1 + α
α
f(qi +
X
j 6=i
xj(bi)) < 0.
By uniqueness, b∗i (qi) is therefore the global maximum on the interval [rdmin; v
d]. To
complete the characterization of the equilibrium, it remains to be shown that a
deviation to a bid bi(qi) < rdmin is not optimal. But in this case
I(bi, qi) = {Q− qi − (n− 1)(v − bi)B}α(vi(qi)− bi),
and the first derivative of this expression, for unrestricted bi, has a unique zero at
b#i (qi) = v(qi)−
q − qi
(1 + α)(n− 1)B .
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Furthermore, as above, ∂2I/∂b2i (b
#
i (qi), qi) < 0. But for qi ≤ q, a straightforward
calculation shows that b#i (qi) ≥ rdmin provided that α ≥ 1/(n − 1). Therefore, by
continuity of I(bi, qi), lowering b∗i (qi) below rdmin cannot improve bidder i’s payoﬀ at
qi < q. Thus, b∗i (qi) is optimal for almost every qi ∈ [0; q]. For qi > q, bidder i cannot
hope for a positive rent, so we may set b∗i (qi) = v−qi/B at these quantities. In sum,
b∗i (qi) is almost everywhere a pointwise maximizer of (16). Clearly, the schedule b∗i (.)
is then a maximizer of (16). Finally, b∗i (.) results from the bid schedule xi(.) given
through (5). ¤
Proof of Proposition 5. By definition, for any i and any eq > 0, the weighted
average tender rate is given by rward (eq, n) = eq−1 R hq0 b∗i (qi)dqi. Proposition 4 implies
b∗i (qi) = vd − qi/Bd. Hence,
rward (eq, n) = vd − eq2Bd . (20)
Denote by Fn(.) the cumulative distribution function of eq = eQ/n. Clearly, Fn(eq) =
1 − (1 − (eq/q))α, where q = Q/n. Noting that E(eq) = R q
0
eqdFn(eq) = q/(1 + α), a
straightforward calculation delivers
E(v(eq)− rward (eq, n)) = q2B α(n+ 1)(1 + α)(n+ α(n− 1)) > 0. (21)
Thus, expected underpricing is strictly positive. Also in the limit,
lim
n→∞
E(v(eq)− rward (eq, n)) = q2B α(1 + α)2 > 0. (22)
The assertions concerning bid shading and discount follow from the obvious in-
equalities rward (eq, n) ≥ rmard (eq, n) and rward (eq, n) ≥ q−1 R q0 b(q)dq, which hold for anyeq ∈ [0; q] and for any n. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6. Using (20), the average bid level in the discriminatory
auction is given by
rward (q, n) = v −
q
2B
(1 +
n
n+ α(n− 1)),
which is strictly increasing in α. We continue with the marginal rate. By Proposition
4, rmard (eq, n) = vd − eq/Bd. Taking expectations yields the expected stop-out rate
E(rmard (eq, n)) = v − qB n+ α(2n− 1)(1 + α)(n+ α(n− 1)) . (23)
Diﬀerentiation shows that this term is strictly increasing in α. The expected average
winning rate is given by
E(rward (eq, n)) = v − q2B 2n+ α(3n− 1)(1 + α)(n+ α(n− 1)) , (24)
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which is likewise strictly increasing in α. It is immediate that the expected marginal
valuation
E(v(eq)) = v − q
(1 + α)B
(25)
is strictly increasing in α. Next, one notes that both expected bid shading
E(v(eq)− rmard (eq, n)) = qB αn(1 + α)(n+ α(n− 1)) (26)
and expected underpricing (21) are strictly increasing in α for α <
p
n/(n− 1).
This condition, however, is safely satisfied if α < 1, as we assumed. The expected
discount is given by
E(v(eq))− qZ
0
b(q)dq =
q
2B
α(n+ 1) + α2(n− 1)
(1 + α)(n+ α(n− 1)) . (27)
Also this expression is strictly increasing in α. Finally, in the limit n → ∞, the
explicit expressions derived above imply that strict monotonicity holds in all con-
sidered cases. ¤
Proof of Proposition 7. From Proposition 1, v = rS + q0/B. Plugging this into
(23), (24), and (25) delivers, after some re-arranging,
(E(rmard (eq, n))− rS)B = (q0 − q) + q α2(n− 1)(1 + α)(n+ α(n− 1)) , (28)
(E(rward (eq, n))− rS)B = (q0 − q) + q α(n+ 1) + 2α2(n− 1)2(1 + α)(n+ α(n− 1)) ,
(E(v(eq))− rS)B = (q0 − q) + q α
1 + α
.
Hence, when q0 and q are inflated proportionally, the expected marginal rate, the
expected average winning rate, and the expected marginal valuation all increase
because of q0 > q. The claim concerning the standard deviation of the marginal
valuation is obvious because v(eq) = rS + (q0 − eq)/B. Explicit expressions for the
expected bid shading (26), expected underpricing (21), for the expected discount
(27), and bid dispersion (10) do all not depend on q0, yet are strictly increasing in
q. This proves the assertion for finite n. But using the explicit expressions, it is
immediate that strict monotonicity holds in all cases also for n→∞. ¤
Proof of Proposition 8. With uniform pricing, expected revenues amount to
E(πu(eq, n)) = nZ q
0
rwaru (eq, n)eqdFn(eq),
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where
rwaru (eq, n) = rmaru (eq, n) = v − eqB n− 1n− 2 . (29)
A straightforward calculation exploitingZ q
0
eq2dFn(eq) = 2q2
(1 + α)(2 + α)
yields that for n > 2,
E(πu(eq, n)) = nq
1 + α
(v − 2q
(2 + α)B
n− 1
n− 2).
With discriminatory pricing, an analogous computation using (20) delivers
E(πd(eq, n)) = nq
1 + α
(v − q
(2 + α)B
2n+ α(2n− 1)
n+ α(n− 1) ) > E(π
u(eq, n)).
It is also straightforward to check that
lim
n→∞
(E(πd(eq, n))− E(πu(eq, n))) = q2
(1 + α)2B
> 0.
This proves the assertion. ¤
Proof of Proposition 9. With remuneration, bidder i’s profit in the uniform-price
auction amounts to Πui + r∗L, where Πui is given by (13). An analysis of the first-
order condition shows that in the Dutch variable-rate tender with remuneration,
counterparties’s bid schedules are identical to those in the basic model, when v is
replaced by v + L
(n−2)B . Similarly, in the discriminatory auction with remuneration,
bidder i’s expected profit is given by
E(Πdi + r
∗L) =
Z Q
0
Z q∗i ( hQ)
0
(vi(qi)− bi(qi))dqi + r∗( eQ)LdF ( eQ).
Assuming that bank j 6= i bids as predicted in Proposition 4, one finds
r∗( eQ) = vd − eQ− q∗i ( eQ)
(n− 1)Bd .
Hence, up to a constant, bidder i’s profit is given by
E(Πdi + r
∗L) = const. +
Z Q
0
Z q∗i ( hQ)
0
(vi(qi) +
L
(n− 1)Bb − bi(qi))dqidF (
eQ).
Thus, if v is replaced by v+ LB
α
n+α(n−1) in the basic model, one obtains an equilibrium
for the American tender with remuneration. This proves the existence of the claimed
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equilibrium in the auctions with remuneration. We consider now first the case
without remuneration, i.e., L = 0. Taking expectations in (29) yields
E(rmaru (eq, n)) = Z q
0
rmaru (eq, n)dFn(eq) = v − q(1 + α)B n− 1n− 2 .
A straightforward calculation using (28) shows that
E(rmaru (eq, n)− E(rmard (eq, n)) = q(1 + α)B ( αnn+ α(n− 1) − 1n− 2).
Thus, E(rmaru (eq, n)) < E(rmard (eq, n) provided that α > α∗ = n/(n2 − 3n + 1). For
n ≥ 4, we have α∗ < 1. For α fixed and n→∞,
lim
n→∞
E(rmaru (eq, n))−E(rmard (eq, n)) = αq(1 + α)2B > 0.
The corresponding claims for the case with remuneration follow from
L
(n− 2)B ≥
L
B
α
n+ α(n− 1) ,
i.e., from the fact that the strategic upwards drift on the expected marginal rate is
stronger for the uniform-price auction than for the discriminatory auction. ¤
Proof of Proposition 10. By returning to the explicit expressions derived in the
proof of Proposition 7, it is easy to check that a ceteris paribus decrease of B to B0
is throughout equivalent to a proportional and simultaneous inflation of q0 and q by
the factor B/B0 > 1. ¤
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Figure 1. Marginal valuations and equilibrium in the uniform-price auction
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Figure 2. Equilibrium in the discriminatory auction
Figure 3. Aggregate bid schedules
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